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During terror attacks, information with unknown credibility might circulate and people use rumors to
compensate for information gaps. On 06.12.2014, three teenagers were kidnapped from a bus station in
the West Bank and found dead after several days. A gag order was issued, causing interest in alternative
sources of information. This study investigated how information spread through WhatsApp during the
search operation using a participatory research approach. 13 rumors circulating on WhatsApp were
collected, nine of which were veriﬁed, and found to be true. A web-based survey revealed that 61.1% of
419 respondents received information regarding the kidnapping through WhatsApp; 38.9% through
Facebook. Sources of two rumors and participation of emergency authorities in rumor dissemination
were identiﬁed. Some rumors originated from the family and community of the abductees, while other
WhatsApp messages included information and names of two abductees, which were not public at the
time. When emergency authorities share unconﬁrmed information, it is perceived as more credible than
information spread by citizens. During the operation, ofﬁcial representatives did not correct or refute any
rumors. Locating the source of a rumor is challenging and thus it is important to actively investigate
rumors in real-time in order to locate the source.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
People are natural information seekers. During an emergency
they search for facts through both ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial sources,
utilizing common and familiar channels (e.g. telephone, email or
text messages) (Stiegler, Tilley and Parveen 2011; Palen& Liu, 2007)
and seek any available venue for information, including newspa-
pers, television, and the Internet (Boyle et al. 2004). However, due
to the high availability and accessibility of the social media, people
rely primarily on social networks to obtain information (Palen &
Liu, 2007). Abbassi et al. (2010) showed that during a crisis, peo-
ple searched for information related to their speciﬁc neighborhood
and community, and activated even weak ties in their social net-
works in order to retrieve it.artment, Recanati School of
ences, Ben-Gurion University
r Ltd. This is an open access articleDuring armed conﬂicts or terror attacks, information with un-
known credibility, from ofﬁcial or unofﬁcial source might circulate.
According to Lewandowsky et al. (2013), two types of inaccurate
information originate from ofﬁcial sources during armed conﬂict:
Misinformation, which is “information presented as truthful
initially but turns out to be false” (488); Disinformation that con-
stitutes “outright false information that is disseminated for pro-
pagandistic purposes” (488).
Rosnow, Yost & Esposito (1986) stated that the more stressful a
situation is perceived to be, the more urgently people will seek to
clarify it and in order to alleviate their own anxiety.
Social media are used during emergencies to distribute relevant,
critical information to the public and the authorities, and may be
simultaneously used to distribute rumors, misinformation and
unveriﬁed data, which propagate rapidly (Mendoza, Poblete and
Castillo 2010; Bird, Ling and Haynes 2012; Hagar, 2013; G 2013,
Gupta, Lamba, Kumaraguru, & Joshi, 2013). Heverin and Zach
(2012) argued that social media tools such as microblogging can
play a vital role in collective sense-making during crises. Where
ofﬁcial information is lacking, social media can operate asunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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nation of false and inaccurate information (Sutton, Palen and
Shklovski 2008). During Hurricane Sandy, a storm which devas-
tated parts of North America in 2012, ‘hostile’ entities distributed
rumors and fake photos, which propagated virally through social
media and caused panic and chaos (Gupta et al. 2013;; Hagar, 2013).
Immediately after the Boston Marathon bombing, a terrorist attack
which killed 3 and injured hundreds in 2013, individuals published
misinformation on Twitter including accusations and inaccurately
identiﬁed the bombers (Cassa, Chunara, Mandl, & Brownstein,
2013; Starbird et al. 2014).
People use rumors to compensate for information and knowl-
edge gaps in order to explain the event (Rosnow, Yost and Esposito
1986). This frequently happens during times of uncertainty and fear
or in the absence of relevant and available information (Ma, 2008).
Dervin’s (1983) theory of sense-making assumes that people
constantly face cognitive gaps in their worlds and try to ﬁll them by
communicating and interacting with others. Formerly, rumors
propagated from mouth-to-ear, a process that took considerable
time to reach large crowds (Hagar, 2013). As long as the information
was not veriﬁed, it was considered a rumor. Kwon, Cha, Jung, Chen,
and Wang (2013) classiﬁed rumors retrospectively into three cat-
egories e true, false, and unknown, after ofﬁcial information was
published. (Kwon et al. 2013). A rumor can be deﬁned as infor-
mation or story that is initiated and distributed without conﬁr-
mation of its credibility or foundation; i.e. without checking
whether it is true or false (Ma, 2008). Ahren and Sosyura (2014)
argued that a rumor consisting of speculation may be accurate at
the time of its publication, but become false at a later stage.
Rosnow, Yost & Esposito (1986) stated that people disseminate two
types of rumors during times of stress and uncertainty, those
containing disturbing information, and those containing comfort-
ing or wishful information.
Evidence reveals that people dismiss misinformation if they are
suspicious of its source (Lewandowsky et al. 2013). Researchers
suggest that the masses act as “collaborative ﬁlters of information”
(Mendoza, Poblete and Castillo 2010).
Limited research has been conducted on the propagation of
rumors through social media during emergencies. Mendoza,
Poblete & Castillo reported that individuals tend to question false
rumors on Twitter, while tweets providing true information tend to
be validated by 95.5% of the readers. Starbird et al. (2014) investi-
gated correction of misinformation via microblogging after the
2013 Boston Marathon Bombing. They explored three rumors (later
found to be false) that were spread on Twitter in the aftermath of
the incident. Their main ﬁnding suggested that “corrections to the
misinformation emerge but are muted compared with the propa-
gation of the misinformation” (p. 654).
WhatsApp is a social network messaging application for
smartphones that allows users to communicate easily. According to
a blog post published in April 2014 by WhatsApp, they have
exceeded 500 million users globally, who share more than 700
million photos and 100 million videos daily (WhatsApp, 2014). In
2015 WhatsApp gained 200 million additional users and reached a
total of 900 million global subscribers (Koum and Zuckerberg
2015). Users can send texts, images, videos, short voice messages
and free calls to other users. WhatsApp users can create groups,
each with up to 100 members and numerous administrators.
WhatsApp is a very popular messaging tool in Israel. According
to a survey conducted in 2014, 92% of smartphone owners in Israel
use WhatsApp, 86% on a daily basis (The Marker 2014). Many
families have created a group to communicate and update each
other. WhatsApp has also ‘inﬁltrated’ the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) and is widely used to exchange information, updates and
general gossip. Following cases where sensitive information waspublished by IDF personnel onWhatsApp, the Information Security
Department banned its use in February 2014 (Dvorin, 2014).
Nonetheless, it is difﬁcult to enforce such a ban; thus, soldiers
continue to use it. WhatsApp is used frequently by all ﬁrst
responder organizations as a communication platform. These or-
ganizations include the Israeli Police, Fire and Rescue Authority,
and Emergency Medical Services. At present, these organizations
use WhatsApp as a formal communication channel to disseminate
notiﬁcations and updates to their personnel on local, regional and
national levels. Although effective risk communications are a
mandatory component of emergency management, security au-
thorities often use a gag order to prevent information leak to the
public.
For the purpose of this paper, any information that circulated
through social media concerning the event was considered as a
rumor, or unveriﬁed information, until proven to be true or false.
This paper uses a participatory action research approach in order to
understand how rumors spread via social media during terror
events.
2. Methodology
2.1. The terror incident
On the night of June 12, 2014, three Israeli teenagers were
kidnapped from a bus station. A few minutes after the kidnapping,
one of the abducted teenagers managed to call the police emer-
gency line and whispered the words “I was kidnapped”. The police
dispatch operator thought it was a prank call and did not follow
required procedures. More than 4 h later, when their families re-
ported their sons as missing, search operations were initiated.
During the early morning hours, the IDF applied for and subse-
quently issued a gag order on the abduction and search operations
concerning the three teenagers (Horowitz, Roth and Weiss 2014).
On July 1, 2014, the operation concluded with the discovery of the
bodies of the three teenagers (IDF Spokesperson, 2015, Lapin,
2014).
Throughout the morning of June 13, there was a buzz in Israel
that ‘something is happening’ or has happened in the security
domain. From noon, various people began to receive WhatsApp
messages mentioning the kidnapping of two teenagers somewhere
in the West Bank. As no information was available to the public,
many rumors began to circulate on social media.
This study was conducted to investigate how information, both
true and false, spread through WhatsApp during the days of the
abduction. The objective was to identify the paths of rumor initi-
ation and propagation through social media and to understand its
mechanisms during a highly sensitive security operation.
2.2. Research tools
In order to study the rumor propagation process, we had to
establish a way to receive the rumors circulating on WhatsApp. On
the morning of June 15, we posted a request on one of our personal
Facebook proﬁles asking people who had received any information
on the kidnapping through social media prior to the ofﬁcial
announcement of the IDF spokesperson on Friday June 13 at 17:00,
to contact us.
The “detective work” done to trace the source of rumors was
based on a methodology described by Scanlon (1977). The current
research and data collection were conducted during the actual
event.
A number of people posted replies on the wall stating that they
received information and some sent private messages. We used
snowball and chain-referral sampling methods to recruit
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following questions:
 What message did you receive (rumor/misinformation/true
information)?
 In which social media platform did you receive it (WhatsApp/
Facebook)?
 When did you receive it?
 From whom did you receive it (group/friend/family)?
 Did you distribute the message further?
 If yes, to whom and when?
BWhether you distributed it further or not, did you think
this message was credible? Can you connect us to the person who sent you the message? If
not, can you ask your source these questions and relay the
response to us?
All answers were recorded on an Excel spreadsheet.
The process was iterative for each source in the chain and
continued until a “dead-end” was reached. A dead-end was deﬁned
as refusal to disclose additional information by one of the sources,
which prevented us from receiving information from or on the next
source. The respondents were requested only to provide informa-
tion concerning the source of the rumors and not to evaluate their
credibility. Fig. 1 presents a conceptual model of the research
process.
Three methods were used to validate the informationwithin the
rumors: 1) information published by formal news channels during
or following, the event that veriﬁed/invalidated the rumor; 2)
contacting the sources mentioned in the rumor; 3) contacting
external ofﬁcial sources that were able to provide additional in-
formation about the rumor, such as military correspondents who
possess knowledge unavailable to the public.
In addition, on Sunday, June 22, a web-based survey was pub-
lished using Qualtrics Research Suite software (Qualtrics, Provo,
Utah) to assess the level of credibility people attribute to infor-
mation published onWhatsApp and Facebook during emergencies.
A link to the survey was published on the author’s emergency
management Facebook group as well as his personal proﬁle page. It
was also distributed via email to approximately 250 employees of
the department where the author is employed. The survey included
14multiple choice questions, focusing on demographic information
(3 questions), social media usage (3 questions), rumors related to
the event (3 questions), social media credibility, trust and privacy (3Fig. 1. A conceptual model of the research process aimed to cquestions), and social media ease and frequency of use (2
questions).
The study was approved by the institutional review board of the
Ben Gurion University of the Negev. All participants gave their
informed consent to participate in the study.3. Results
Twelve people responded on June 16 by posting a reply to the
Facebook post or through a private message. Eight more contacted
us directly via phone or email during the next two days. Through
questioning these sources, we discovered 12 other rumors circu-
lating on WhatsApp.
Table 1 presents the categorization of the 13 rumors (appendix 1
portrays the rumors), the ﬁrst time they were circulated on
WhatsApp, the earliest source reached and the topic. The catego-
rization was made retrospectively. Following the veriﬁcation pro-
cess, nine (69%) out of the 13 rumors were found to be true.
Of the nine rumors disseminated during the ﬁrst day (June 13,
2014), ﬁve identiﬁed the names of two of the kidnapped teenagers.
This information was not publicly available and was under
censorship due to a military gag order. Only on Saturday June 15,
the IDF censor approved the names of the three kidnapped teen-
agers for publication (YNET., 2014).
Rumor 3 was traced through two different threads, three levels
deep, to two sources who are both highly connected to the press - a
journalist and a university Communications professor. While
speaking with a journalist’s relative, she said, “oops, I just saw that
it was written ‘not to publish’.” A senior military correspondent of a
leading newspaper conﬁrmed that the IDF Spokesperson provided
the information relayed in the rumor in a statement he delivered to
the military correspondents, requesting them not to disseminate it
any further. According to him, one of the participants in the
meeting transcribed the IDF Spokesperson’s statement and
disseminated it.
Rumor 7 contained the names of two of the kidnapped teen-
agers requesting more information and included a phone number.
As a phone number was part of the message, we did not need to
trace its source. The owner of the number stated that he sent it after
receiving a request from the General Security Services (GSS). Ac-
cording to the source, it was clear at 05:00 that they [the boys] were
kidnapped, and he sent the message at 07:00. The source also
mentioned that hewas a classmate of the two kidnapped teenagers,
and that during the ﬁrst hours they did not know that a thirdollect rumors, trace their source and verify their content.
Table 1
The 13 collected rumors according to their source and status (veriﬁed as true or false). Security ofﬁcials include IDF personnel as well as ﬁrst responders. Family refers to the
family members of the kidnapped teenagers.
Rumor’s # (appendix 1) Veriﬁed as true Veriﬁed as false Cannot be conﬁrmed Total rumors
Source Security ofﬁcials 1, 8, 13 1 8 13 3
NGOs 2 2 1
Family 4 4 1
Private citizens 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 6, 7, 11 5, 9, 10 7
Journalists 3 3 1
Fig. 2. The sources of rumor #8 (appendix 1), their afﬁliation and dissemination path.
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numerous phone calls from people reproaching him for publishing
this information, as they claimed it was incorrect/inaccurate. Ac-
cording to the source, the callers stated that upon reading his
message they immediately searched YNET, Israel’s largest news site,
and because no information was published there they concluded
that it was false. At 10:00, the source said he received a call from a
person living in a nearby settlement, who reported that he had
driven past the bus stop fromwhere they were kidnapped and had
seen the three teenagers. He recognized the third one, and due to
this phone call, the security forces learned that three rather than
two people were kidnapped.
Rumor 8 had the widest circulation, as it stated that the
kidnapped teenagers were rescued. It included information that
appeared credible and was worded as if ofﬁcially released by the
IDF Spokesperson. Of the initial 12 sources, seven distributed the
rumor further. Two shared it only with one family member, two
shared it with their WhatsApp family group, one shared it with an
IDF ofﬁcers’ WhatsApp group, one ﬁrst responder shared it verbally
with his colleagues during his shift and one refused to answer the
question. The other eight sources provided only the date and time
they received the rumor. An in-depth investigation was conducted
on the input provided by the 12 respondents, enabling four of the
rumor threads to be traced, three levels of sources deep (Fig. 2). This
graph presents the research method conducted in order to locate
the sources and dissemination path, displaying one rumor as an
example. The fourth level source could not be reached, but the
sources stated that it originated from an IDF member.
Rumor 9 was received through two contacts; one was a senior
ofﬁcial in the government who requested help in tracing the rumor.
The IDF Home Front Command (HFC) posted on their Facebook
page that rumor 9 was incorrect and was not published by them
(HFC 2014).
Rumor 10 was initially received through two contacts, but
continued to propagate on WhatsApp until the afternoon of July 1,
2014, one day after the discovery of the three bodies.
Rumor 13 that pertained to the physical status of the bodies was
received through a colleague whose brother was an IDF soldier
involved in the search and rescue operations. Ofﬁcials from the
Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Health declined to
comment on it.
Fig. 3 presents the timeline of the rumors disseminated during
the event. The information was collected during the event,
commencing immediately after the kidnapping on June 13,
continuing until the bodies were found on July 1.
In order to learn how the public uses social media, especially
Facebook and WhatsApp, we distributed a web-based survey. The
ﬁnal sample included 419 respondents who fully completed the
survey (among 471 who began to respond to the questionnaire).
Among the respondents, 57% were female and 43% male. 92% and
72% use WhatsApp and Facebook respectively to send and receive
messages, and 85% use WhatsApp rather than Facebook to keep in
touch with their families. WhatsApp is used more frequently than
Facebook (Z ¼ 9.37, p < 0.001): 46.5% reported they use theapplication hourly, while 19% reported the same for Facebook. A
total of 40.4% stated that they received the (false) rumor regarding
the successful rescue operation of the kidnapped boys a day after it
occurred, through WhatsApp. Among those who received it, 21.9%
stated they forwarded it to others. 46% reported that they received
it through a WhatsApp group, 8.4% through a colleague, 23.7%
through a friend, and 21.7% through a family member. Only 34%
stated that they did not receive any information regarding the
kidnapping through social media. Of those who received updates,
61.1% received them through WhatsApp and 38.9% through
Facebook.
The respondents perceived WhatsApp to be signiﬁcantly more
private than Facebook (Z ¼ 14.67, p < 0.001) while Facebook’s
credibility was perceived as signiﬁcantly higher (Z ¼ 3.74,
p < 0.001) than that of WhatsApp messages (35% rated Facebook
credibility as reasonable vs. 23.5% for WhatsApp).
4. Discussion
The process of collecting the 13 rumors was sometimes difﬁcult,
especially following the news that the police were also looking into
this subject. Kwon et al. (2013) noted that the study of rumor
Fig. 3. The full timeline showing the rumors and date and time of the earliest source found. Green frame represents a veriﬁed rumor, and a red frame represents an unveriﬁed
rumor. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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the right time.” Scanlon described the collection process as work
executed by a detective (Scanlon 1977), but in this case, the authors
did not have the police’s authority for investigation and question-
ing. Thus, cooperation from the initial sources was based on trust
and assurances not to disclose their involvement. Several re-
spondents expressed their willingness to contribute, which is
consistent with previous research that showed that during emer-
gencies, people want to act and contribute (Sutton, Palen and
Shklovski 2008; Wolensky, 1979). Another factor that made the
collection process more difﬁcult was the inherent difference be-
tween the sharing mechanisms of Twitter and Facebook vs.
WhatsApp. Whereas the identity of the originator is known and
visible while sharing on Twitter (retweet) or Facebook, there is no
way to know the source of messages shared on WhatsApp.
The results indicate that rumors and information originated
from the family and close community of the three teenagers. One
example is the prayer request for their wellbeing, which was
disseminated within their religious community, who were already
aware of their disappearance. The WhatsApp message included
speciﬁc information and the names of two of the teenagers. This
information was not known at the time, which might explain their
distribution to much larger circles, beyond the community’s virtual
boundaries. Previous research has shown that during emergencies
people leverage information technologies to “ﬁnd community” and
to use it to assist one another (Shklovski, Palen and Sutton 2008). Amore recent study found that WhatsApp enhances a “sense of
belonging“ to a community and “sense of connection” with various
groups (Church & Oliveira, 2013).
The government issued a very strict gag order on the kidnapping
and the military search operation, even including a clause prohib-
iting publication of the existence of the gag order (Horowitz, Roth
and Weiss 2014). This caused a ‘severe’ lack of information for the
public, as no ofﬁcial information could be released. During the
morning and early afternoon of the day after the abduction (June
14), eight rumors/stories circulated on WhatsApp, until the IDF
Spokesperson released a few details concerning the incident during
his ﬁrst press conference. The gag order, coupled with incomplete
information circulating through WhatsApp, increased people’s ef-
forts to ﬁnd information. This behavior is consistent with that
found in previous research. Mileti and Darlington (1997) showed
that during periods of intense stress, people use whatever means
available to obtain information. This is especially evident during
terror events inwhich the main goal is to create “feelings of anxiety
and fear among its targets” (Ben-Yehuda, 2005). Nonetheless, the
gag order was only presented to traditional news outlets. The
general population did not know about its existence and thus
continued to share information on social media, especially through
WhatsApp. This study shows that the traditional gag order does not
affect social media, and cannot control or inhibit the ﬂow of in-
formation through the sources.
Similar to recent terror events (Simon, Goldberg, Aharonson-
T. Simon et al. / Computers in Human Behavior 64 (2016) 183e190188Daniel, Leykin, & Adini, 2014), the initial news and information
about the kidnapping were initially disseminated to the public
through social media.
The public used WhatsApp throughout the entire event as a
priority channel to communicate and share information. These
ﬁndings indicate that the public perceives WhatsApp to be signif-
icantly more private than Facebook. It seems that during a sensitive
security event, WhatsApp (in comparison to other communication
channels) is perceived by the public as a safer, more private conduit
to discuss and share rumors, without the risk of being exposed to
the police (risk of legal prosecution) or to unwanted eyes (risk of
leaking conﬁdential information). During emergencies and times of
high stress, when information is lacking, people will try to obtain
information using backchannels, such as social media (Sutton,
Palen and Shklovski 2008). Although the gag order was probably
issued because the authorities were concerned about the teenagers’
wellbeing, many of the rumors can be deﬁned as news updates
regarding the military operation and its outcomes, providing an
alternative to the lack of ofﬁcial reports. During the last few years,
the public has used social media to report news regarding terror
attacks worldwide, as well as acted as civilian journalists (Burnap
et al. 2014;; Laituri & Kodrich, 2008).
In Israel, journalists covering military and defense issues receive
updates from the IDF Spokesperson, even though a gag order is in
place. On the morning of June 14, the IDF Spokesperson conducted
an internal brieﬁng with all journalists covering the military
operation and provided exclusive information about the incident.
These updates are based on trust and a long-standing relationship
between journalists and the IDF Spokesperson. Through two rumor
chains we found that two journalists leaked information from this
conﬁdential brieﬁng to their families through WhatsApp. Lee
(2007) mentioned in his paper that, “reporters covering national
security issues observe that sensitive topics involving classiﬁed
information can only be conﬁrmed and placed into context through
conﬁdential sources.” In our case, the journalists received classiﬁed
information directly and ofﬁcially from the IDF, based on trust and
the knowledge that the information is protected by a court-issued
gag order. The two journalists informed their close circle only
through WhatsApp, probably perceiving it to be a private channel,
but by doing so, breached their trust with the IDF. Bierbauer (2011)
mentions that although journalists want to publish and expose
information, “most are inclined to accept the necessity for some
degree of secrecy”, especially when granted ofﬁcial access to sen-
sitive military information. Future research should address this
issue, and strive to interview journalists after a conﬁdential military
brieﬁng, in order to identify how many of them shared classiﬁed
information.
During this event we found that emergency authorities,
including ﬁrst responders, shared and forwarded rumors to others.
Two sources stated that they either shared the rumors with their
colleagues or received it through their organization’s ofﬁcial
WhatsApp group. Both organizations have a solid presence on
Facebook, and during emergencies they share relevant information
with the public. This ﬁnding is inconsistent with previous litera-
ture. According to a report published by the US Department of
Justice, ﬁrst responders should dispel rumors and provide accurate
information about the event (Chapman et al. 2002). When emer-
gency authorities and ﬁrst responders, even in an unofﬁcial ca-
pacity, share unconﬁrmed information during emergencies, the
information is perceived to be more credible than information
spread by regular citizens. Wray et al. (2008) noted that during
emergencies, the public perceives ﬁrst responders as more credible
as they are perceived to hold valid information. This process may
create rumor ampliﬁcation and disseminate the rumor faster and to
even larger crowds. The public does not understand that ﬁrstresponders do not necessarily know everything about an ongoing
emergency, especially during a terror event in which information
may be highly compartmentalized, even among security forces.
Similar to citizens, ﬁrst responders also strive to obtain information
by every possible means. Furthermore, this ﬁnding extends the
concept of ‘backchannels’ used by emergency authorities to
circumvent communication gaps and prohibitions against dissem-
inating information (Sutton, Palen & Shklovski, (2008).
During the entire operation, ofﬁcial representatives did not
correct or refute any of the rumors. The three main TV channels
continuously broadcasted commentary from many former ofﬁcials
and military generals. This caused many people to stay tuned to
their TVs in the hope that new information would be released.
Research shows that during emergency events, individuals are
exposed to large quantities of information without knowing the
validity or risk of misinformation (Lu & Yang, 2010). One of the ﬁrst
actions people take is to try to validate the information through
other and/or ofﬁcial sources (Glik, 2007). In this case, no other
sources of reliable information were available, so the public relied
on the information disseminated through social media, especially
WhatsApp. However, during the early morning of June 13, 2014,
people who received one or more of the rumors, as in the case of
rumor 7, could not ﬁnd any validating information on news sites, so
they did not believe the content.
This ﬁnding is in contrast to other studies that found that mass
social media self-regulates in emergencies, as people question in-
formation they do not trust or validate correct information
(Mendoza, Poblete and Castillo 2010; Heverin & Zach, 2012;
Starbird et al. 2014). Future research should examine whether the
rumors spread on social media during terror events are different
than those propagated during other types of emergencies.
Locating the source of a rumor, even in real time, is almost
impossible. Various studies proposed an epidemiological investi-
gation to ﬁnd the ‘patient zero’, using the rationale that the spread
of an infection is similar to the propagation of rumors (Cane, 1966).
Others, using a computerized model knew the source of the rumor
all along, and during the propagation process each ‘member’ was
aware of the original source (Haeupler, 2013). A number of papers
reported that the researchers assumed to know who originated the
rumor, and the exact path of the rumor through a deﬁned network
(Calves) (Borge-Holthoefer, Meloni, Gon¸calves, & Moreno, 2013;;
Haeupler, 2013). Similar to the epidemiological public health
methodology, the current study used ‘manual’ methods to collect
and track the path of the rumors. The adoption of this approach is
unique, as most work in the ﬁeld of social media research is con-
ducted using automated, computerizedmethods. The problemwith
using computerized models to track rumor propagation is that they
rely on monotonic ‘human’ behavior (Zhang, Zhou, Zhang, Guan, &
Zhou, 2013), or on a deterministic model, which offers an algorithm
for tracking the dissemination of rumors more efﬁciently and in
“optimal running time” (Haeupler, 2013). While these methods
offer novel research approaches, they do not necessarily predict
actual human behavior.
4.1. Limitations
Snowball sampling has two limitations that should be
mentioned. The ﬁrst is that it may impact on the generalizability of
the paper as there might be a bias towards the initial list of sources
(seed list). Although the seed list may have been biased, the chain
effect of this technique allowed us to reach the deeper and hidden
sources, otherwise unreachable, of the rumors. A signiﬁcant
advantage of leveraging the snowball sampling, for this research,
was the trust existing between the sources during the referral
process, resolving the issue of people who do not want to be
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to reach disjoint groups. However, this paper presented that the
second limitation may be less signiﬁcant while dealing with social
media. The sources reached during the research process are
distinctly disjoint from the community and social milieu of the
authors emphasizing the strength of this method for social media
research. Despite the limited sample sizewe believe that the overall
scope of the study, in which all of the identiﬁed rumors that
circulated during the duration of the rescue operation were iden-
tiﬁed and traced, compensates for this limitation and enables to
draw conclusions that shed a light on rumor propagation through
social media in emergencies. We believe that the comprehensive
tracing, veriﬁcation and validation process enabled to identify all
rumors that were disseminated throughout the event; this process
included both a call for the general public as well as a direct
approach to Ministerial authorities such as the Ministry of Internal
Security - responsible for all ﬁrst responders andMinistry of Health,
security agencies ﬁrst responders organizations, as well as civilian
authorities.
Another limitation materialized a few days after the research
began when the Israeli Police started its own investigation into
these rumors and their sources. This introduced a difﬁculty in
gaining the trust and cooperation of the sources in providing the
required information as well as their sources. In order to mitigate it
and alleviate the concerns of the sources, we provided extensive
information and background during the introduction to the
research and throughout the investigation process.
5. Conclusions
Rumors pose a real challenge for ﬁrst responders and other
authorities in emergencies. Rumors may create moral dilemmas
and can affect the perception emergency responders attribute to
their positions. Commanders and leaders of emergency organiza-
tions should have policies and guidelines in place to manage ru-
mors propagating within their organizations during emergencies.
These should include a direct way to notify the organization of the
rumor, and to notify employees regarding their authenticity. In-
formation originating from emergency authorities to the public is
perceived as true and reliable.
Furthermore, this study has shown that it is very important to
actively search for rumors during emergencies. For the collection
process, it might be advisable to use personnel external to the
emergency agencies, as people might be more reluctant to share
the information and especially their sources with authority ﬁgures.
This study, as well as others, showed that individuals, whether
citizens or emergency responders, actively search for information
during emergencies, especially when no ofﬁcial information is
available. Within organizations, such behavior can be managed if
information is provided in a “push” mode, where employees are
notiﬁed proactively about circulating rumors and their authenticity
(as much as possible). This canminimize rumor dissemination from
within emergency organizations. Future research should focus on
the behavior of ﬁrst responders and other emergency personnel
regarding rumors and information exchange with the public.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2016.06.058.
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